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The U.S. Beef Promotion and Research
Act, part of the 1985 Farm Security Act,
authorized a producer checkoff (Beef
Checkoff Program) to enhance (shift)
domestic and foreign demand for U.S. beef
products.  The checkoff assessment became
mandatory when approved by 79 percent of
producers in a 1988 national referendum
vote.  
Under the Beef Checkoff Program
domestic and imported cattle are assessed a
fee of $1 per head, paid by the seller, in
addition to a comparable assessment on
imported beef and beef products.  Of this
amount, 50 cents is retained by the state
beef councils and the other 50 cents is sent
to the national-level Cattlemen's Beef
Promotion and Research Board.  State beef
councils may also allocate a portion of their
50 cents to the national-level board.  
The national-level Cattlemen's Beef
Promotion and Research Board, subject to
USDA oversight, administers the dollars
which are principally allocated to beef
promotion, research, and education and
information (see Table 1).
On June 21, 2002 a South Dakota Federal
District Court judge ruled the Beef
Checkoff Program as unconstitutional
because of violating the First Amendment
rights under the U.S. Constitution. 
Revenues collected under the program were
to have terminated July 15, 2002. 
However, in early July, the U.S. Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals granted an
injunction stay, which allowed the checkoff
assessments to continue during an appeals
period.  
The suit was filed by the Livestock
Marketing Association (LMA), the Western
Organization of Resource Councils
(WORC), and several other plaintiffs. 
The appeals action was pursued by the
U.S. Department of Justice, Nebraska
Cattlemen, Inc., and two individuals.
Beef Market Trends
Beef producers have faced severely
declining real cattle prices, nominal
prices adjusted for inflation, for several
decades.  For example, from 1980 to
2001, the real Nebraska fed steer price
(1100-1300 lbs) declined from
$81.98/cwt to $40.45/cwt, or a 51 percent
decline.  Real Oklahoma feeder steer
price (600-650 lbs) declined from
$90.20/cwt to $53.80/cwt, or a 40 percent
decline.
A major reason for the long-term decline
in cattle prices has been the reduction
(shift) in per capita retail demand for
beef.  Per capita production of beef has
also declined, but its rate of decline has
been less than that of per capita demand.  
From 1980 to 2001, retail demand for
beef, measured by the choice retail beef
demand index, declined by about 43
percent.  The decline has been attributed
to changing consumer preferences due to
health, food safety, and product
consistency problems.  It has also
reflected changing demographics and
relatively lower competitive meat (pork
and poultry) prices.  For the same period,
per capita beef production declined by
about 3 percent.  Total beef production,
however, increased by about 22 percent. 
Cattle slaughter increased moderately by
about 5 percent, but average dressed
weights increased by about 13 percent. 
The later has been attributed to
technology changes, breeding genetics,




jmarsh@montana.eduTable 1:  Allocation of Beef Checkoff Dollars, 1998-2001
2001 2000 1999 1998
Revenues:  
   Assessments
    Interest
    Other 
$85,444,000
    3,024,000
       334,000
$88,042,000
    2,872,000
       375,000
$83,542,000
    2,739,000




TOTAL REVENUES $88,802,000 $91,289,000 $86,782,000 $86,232,000
Expenses:
   
  Program Expenses:
   
    Promotion
    Research
    Consumer Information
    Industry Information
    Foreign Marketing
    Producer Communications  
    Evaluation







       75,000







     165,000















       93,000
     703,000
TOTAL PROGRAM
EXPENSES
$80,822,000 $81,598,000 $77,608,000 $79,357,000
Depart. of Agriculture Oversight
Collections
Administration 
   170,000
1,429,000
5,796,000
   195,000
1,393,000
5,900,000
   173,000
1,508,000
5,648,000
   171,000
1,461,000
5,368,000
TOTAL EXPENSES $88,217,000 $89,086,000 $84,937,000 $86,357,000
have increased calf weaning weights and
slaughter cattle weights.
Advertising Goals
The purpose of generic promotion under
the Beef Checkoff Program is to enhance
consumer demand for beef products,
which had been declining since the late
1970s.  If generic advertising results in
increasing consumer demand for beef by
more than checkoff costs, then farm-level
demand and prices for livestock should
increase, given adequate competition in
the marketing channel.  If there was little
competition in the red meat channel, a
positive change in consumer demand
from advertising would primarily
increase retailer or processor margins. 
Statistical studies have shown that
increases in retail beef demand are
transferred to the farm level prices, even
though meat packer and retail grocery
market concentration have increased
(Brester and Marsh; Wohlgenant).  
Allowing for by-product values and farm-
to-retail product conversion (i.e., it takes
2.4 pounds of liveweight steer to produce
one pound of retail beef), an increase in
retail beef price of one cent per pound
does not necessarily mean an increase in
live cattle price of one cent per pound (or
one dollar per cwt).  This is primarily due
to marketing costs incurred by firms in
the red meat channel to change the form,
location, and timing of product coming to
market.
Advertising Effectiveness
Generic advertising involves promoting
general commodities such as beef or pork
rather than brand name products of
processing or retailing firms.  A generic
advertising example is the slogan, “Beef,
It's What's For Dinner,” which is
supported by promotion dollars paid by
producers under the Beef Checkoff
Program. 
Studies that have addressed the effects of
generic advertising on the beef industry
are generally inconclusive with respect to
the effects of advertising expenditures,
excluding private branding, on retail beef
demand.  Beef advertising studies
published in research journals have
varied by the economic models and
statistical methods employed, sample
design and time periods, data
measurements, and interpretation of
results.  Therefore, statistical results have
shown that the effects of generic
advertising expenditures on retail beef
demand (i.e., to shift demand) range from
extremely small to relatively large.  The
effect of generic adverstising on beef
demand is measured by an advertising
elasticity, which is the percentage change
in the beef demand due to a one percent
change in advertising expenditures.  For
beef, the portion of checkoff dollars
allocated to generic advertising are
usually spent by advertising agencies, the
target audience being the consumer.
For the U.S. beef market, one of the
smaller advertising elasticities is that of
0.0005 reported by Altson, Freebairn, and
James.  This suggest that a 10 percent
increase in beef advertising expenditures
increases retail beef demand by only
0.005 percent (10.0 x 0.0005).  Coulibaly
and Brorsen obtained even smaller
elasticities (i.e., such as 0.0003).  The
relatively larger advertising elasticity is
that of 0.025 reported by Ward and
Lambert.  In their case, a 10 percent
increase in beef advertising expendituresincreases retail beef demand by 0.25
percent (10.0 x 0.025).  
The effects of generic advertising on
Australian beef demand were also
investigated.  The estimated Australian
advertising elasticities were slightly
higher than that of Ward and Lambert's,
i.e., from 0.03 to 0.05 (Piggott, et. al.;
Piggott, Piggott, and Wright).
Other beef advertising research has
reported advertising elasticities that are
between these relatively low and high
estimates.  Cranfield gave an elasticity of
0.004 for Australian and Canadian beef. 
Brester and Schroeder gave an elasticity
of 0.006, and Kinnucan, et. al. reported
an advertising elasticity of 0.0011 for
U.S. beef.  
Using the coefficient of 0.006, for
example, indicates a 10 percent increase
in generic advertising increases retail
beef demand by 0.06 percent.  The
paucity of these coefficients is due to the
fact that generic beef advertising
expenditures are  and extremely small
percentage of total consumer beef
expenditures.  This ratio is referred to as
an advertising intensity.  
Studies have shown these advertising
intensities only average about 0.05
percent.  In addition, the small
coefficients are thought to reflect
measurement problems of generic
advertising.  That is, aggregate data on
promotion (checkoff) expenditures used
in statistical models may obscure the true
advertising effects by failing to account
for the quantity and quality of messages
consumers receive.  Small advertising
elasticities also reflect beef's substitute
relationships with pork, poultry, and fish
and average production costs (or scale
economies) of firms in the red meat
marketing channel.
Advertising Examples
The various estimates of beef advertising
elasticities and their effects on producer
prices and production can be
demonstrated by using the above-cited
elasticity range of 0.0005 to 0.025.  My
analysis assumes that eliminating beef
checkoff expenditures precludes spending
on generic advertising, that changes in
retail beef demand subsequently changes
livestock prices, that changes in producer
prices changes calf crop production, and
that branded beef advertising by
processors or retailers is not affected.  In
addition, cattle trade with Canada and
Mexico is held unchanged.  
The advertising elasticities are used in an
econometric model of beef demand and
supply at the retail and farm levels to
estimate the cattle price and production
effects.  The focus is on feeder cattle
price and calf-crop production of the
cow-calf producer.
Overall, the model indicates that
reductions in generic advertising reduces
retail beef demand and, subsequently,
feeder steer prices and calf crop
production.  The feeder price and
production estimates are based upon an
average price of $95.30/cwt for a 650
pound feeder steer and a calf crop of
38.28 million head in 2001.  The results
of hypothetically eliminating the Beef
Checkoff Program (from a promotion
perspective) are:  (1) using an advertising
demand elasticity of 0.0005 results in a
$0.011/cwt (1.1 cents/cwt) reduction in
feeder steer price and a calf-crop decline
of about 4,200 head,  and (2) using a
demand elasticity of 0.025 results in a
$0.58/cwt reduction in feeder steer price
and a calf-crop decline of about 214,000
head.  An intermediate advertising
elasticity, such as Brester and Schroeder's
0.006, results in a $0.14/cwt decline in
feeder steer price and a reduction in the
calf crop of about 50,000 head.
The cost to cow-calf producers of
advertising under the checkoff program is
about $0.51/head (i.e., about 51 percent
of the $1 checkoff fee went to promotion
and pertinent administration costs in
2001).  Of course, a feeder calf may be
sold two or three times between weaning
and slaughter.  Thus, a total investment
cost equal to 2.0 or 3.0 times $0.51/head
may be incurred, with the cost allocated
among the different sellers.  
Table 2 provides the estimated benefits
and costs (per feeder) to cow-calf
producers of generic beef advertising
under the Beef Checkoff Program.  The
estimated benefits are conditional upon
the range of advertising elasticities
discussed above.  The benefits are
calculated as cow-calf revenues with the
Beef Checkoff Program less cow-calf
revenues without the Beef Checkoff
Program.  The estimates take into account
reductions in both the feeder steer price
and calf crop as advertising is eliminated. 
The promotion costs are $0.51/hd and are
specific only to the $1 checkoff levy on
the cow-calf producer.  The Net Benefits
column is the Benefits column less the
Cost column. 
With the different advertising elasticities,
the net benefits (shown in Table 2) range
from negative to positive.  For example,
under the relatively small advertising
elasticity of 0.0005, producer net benefits
are -$0.35/head and under the relatively
large advertising elasticity of 0.025,
producer net benefits are $6.75/ head. 
The advertising elasticity of 0.006 yields
a moderate net benefit of $1.22/head. 
Therefore, because of the varying
advertising elasticities given by research,
the producer effects of eliminating beef
promotion expenditures cannot be
established with certainty.
Concluding Remarks
The difficulty of determining generic
advertising effectiveness of beef products
does not preclude, from an industry
perspective, necessary exposure in the
consumer market.  In all likelihood, there
is some positive consumer demand
response to increases in generic beef
advertising.  However, the promotion
return to each checkoff dollar invested
cannot be established with certainty.  In
addition, withdrawal of promoting U.S.
beef products in foreign markets would
not be wise, as producers depend upon
expanded sales in these growth areas. 
Furthermore, it undoubtedly behooves
beef producers to promote their product
(and avoid losing market share) due to the
promotion activities of their competitors
in the pork and poultry industries.
The potential effects of eliminating the
Beef Checkoff Program involves
evaluating factors besides advertising. 
Checkoff dollars are also allocated to
research, education, marketing, and
industry information.  There is
incomplete information on which to
examine the effects on demand of
expenditures for research, education, and
marketing and industry information. 
However, expenditures for these types of
information undoubtedly have some
degree of impact on producer prices and
incomes since they target demand and
production/marketing costs.Table 2:  Benefits and Costs to Cow-Calf Producers of Generic Advertising
                                                                            Using Different Advertising Elasticities 






















Note:  Calculations are based on elimination of generic beef
advertising if the Beef Checkoff Program was eliminated
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